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the pleading is defective since a cause of action for damages 
suffered by the parents because of injury to their minor 
child is community property (Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 
622, 630 [248 P.2d 922]) and Buel 's alleged wilful misconduct 
is imputable to Esther. (Ibid.) [19] [nsofar as Esther 
attempts to state a cause of action against her minor son, 
James, the pleading is defective since it faih: to comply with 
the requirements of section 376 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure.4 
'rhe jn('\gment iR reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
[Crim. No. 5770. In Bank. Oct. 28, 19fi5.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. HENRY THOMAS, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law- Writ of Error Coram Nobis- Procedure-
Jurisdiction.-Where a judgment of conviction was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court on appeal, a subsequent petition for 
writ of error coram nobis must be addressed to that court and 
not to the superior court. (Pen. Code, § 1265.) 
[2) Habeas Corpus-Proceedings After Judgment-Successive Ap-
piications.-A petition for habeas corpus, based on the same 
grounds set forth in a previous petition which was denied, 
will be denied where there has been no change in the facts 
or law substantially affecting the legal rights of petitioner. 
[3) Criminal Law-Judgment- Arraignment: Appeal- Harmless 
Error-Judgment.-While the requirement that defendant be 
asked if he has any reason why judgment should not be pro-
nounced (Pen. Code, §§ 1200, 1201) is substantial and a failure 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 107; Am.Jur., Habeas 
Corpus, §§ 164, 165. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 1038(4); [2] Habeas 
Corpus, § 72; [3] Criminal Law,§§ 1006, 1440; [4] Criminal Law, 
§ 1298; [5, 6] Criminal Law, § 212. 
"'The parent8 of a legitimate unmarried minor child, acting jointly, 
may maintain an action for injury to such child caused by the wrongful 
act or neglect of another. If either parent shall fail on demand to join 
as plaintiff in such action or is dead or cannot be found, then the other 
parent m~y maintain such action and the parent, if living, who does not 
join as plaintiff must be joined as a defendant •• , , " 
434 PEOPLE [4;) C.2d 
to ask the question is fatal to the judgment if defendant has 
been deprivrd of counsel, it is not fatal where defendant is 
present and rPpr<'sPnted by counsel, and no pre;jmlice appears. 
[4] Id.-Appeal-Presumptions-Judgment.-In the absence of 
any showing to the contrary, where the judgment recites that 
defendant was asbed if he had any reason why judgment 
should not be pronounced, it must be presumed on appeal that 
such recital is correct. 
[5] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea.-The proper procedure for 
withdrawal of a plea after judgment is a motion to set aside 
the judgment and permit a withdrawal of the plea, and 
such a motion is in the nature of, and is subject to the rules 
governing, an application for a writ of error coram nobis. 
[6] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea.-An application for with-
drawal of a guilty plea after judgment will be granted only 
where there exists some fact that, had it been known to the 
court, would have prevented rendition of the judgment, which 
fact was not known to defendant at that time, and which, 
without fraud, mistake or negligence of defendant, was not 
presented to the court. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Siskiyou 
County denying a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction. 
James lVL Allen, ,Judge. Appeal dismissed. 
A. J. Zirpoli for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
CAR'fER, .T.-This is an appeal from an order of the 
superior court denying a motion to vacate a judgment of 
conviction rendered by that court which imposed the death 
penalty for murder of the first degree after a plea of guilty; 
the motion in the court below was also for withdrawal of 
the plea of guilty, and for a stay of execution. The proceed-
ing .in the court below would thus appear to be an application 
for a writ of coram nobis. This court granted a stay of 
execution in order that defendant's appeal might be consid-
ered. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by this court 
on automatic appeal. (People v. Thomas, 37 Cal.2d 74 [230 
P.2d 351] .) 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 260. 
[6j See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 259. 
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In support of his motion defendant presented to the court 
below an affidavit in which he stated; (1) rrhat he is in 
the custody of the warden of San Quentin Prison under the 
judg·ment of conviction; that although the judgment recites 
that after a hearing on the degree of the offense the court 
asked defendant whether he had any legal cause to show 
why judgment should not be pronounced and defendant made 
no i'eply, that such was not true and lw was not so asked. 
(2) That defendant was arraigned on December 4, 1950, 
and counsel for him, Brawman, was appointed. At the time 
to plead on December 6, after a short appearance in court, 
Brawman, the district attorney, and judge retired to the 
latter's chambers where the jndge stated that Brawman had 
told him defendant was ready to plead guilty but hoped he 
might be saved the death penalty and that the district attorney 
would not insist on that penalty under those circumstances. 
The judge had told Brawman he wanted to think it over and 
suggested the instant conference. At the conference the 
judge said that he had since gone over the transcript of the 
preliminary examination and would not bargain since he 
was inclined to impose the death penalty whether thP plea 
was guilty or not guilty. Brawman, the district attornPy and 
judge then returned to the courtroom and the judge declared 
court in session again. Defendant claims that Brawman did 
not tell him of the conference and that he had no knowledge 
thereof. ( 3) 'fhat the trial was ''fatally infected'' because: 
(a) He was denied effective assistance of counsel because 
Brawman consulted with him for only a "few minutes" on 
the day of arraignment; a ''few minutes'' in the sheriff's 
office thereafter and for five minutes after the conference 
heretofore mentioned. (b) 'l'here was not a ''competent and 
intelligent'' waiver of a jury trial. (c) The court did not 
advise him of his rights and the consequences of a plea of 
guilty. (d) rrhe plea was not understandingly entered and 
the proceedings were too hurried. ( 4) rrhat he told his counsel 
that he had a good military record; that he had some whiskey 
before the robbery; that there was a scuffle before he shot 
and he had not intended to kill Mrs. Aillsworth; that none 
of these things were brought out at the hearing on the 
degree of the crime and the punishment to be imposed. 
Defendant presented points and authorities with his motion. 
After considering defendant's affidavits and points and 
authorities the motion was denied. 
The attorney general has noticed a motion to dismiss the 
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appeal or to affirm the court's order of denial on the ground 
that the motion was frivolous and only to delay the execution 
in that the issues raised on the motion had been adjudicated 
adversely to defendant by this court in the original automatic 
appeal (People v. Thomas, supra, 37 Cal.2d 74), and in the 
denial of two petitions for habeas corpus, as well as by the 
United States District Court and Court of Appeals (Thomas 
v. Teets, 220 F.2d 232); that since defendant's motion in the 
trial court was a petition for a writ of error coram nobis 
it should have been addressed to this court under section 1265 
of the Penal Code.1 
[1] With reference to the last contention that a petition 
for a writ of error coram nobis must be made to an appellate 
court, although this court has not passed on section 1265, 
supra, the District Court of Appeal has held that it is not 
a violation of due process nor an encroachment of the juris-
diction of the superior court as stated in our Constitution 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 5; People v. Sica, 116 Cal.App.2d 59 
[253 P.2d 75]) and that the jurisdiction of the appellate 
court is exclusive. (People v. Dunlop, 102 Cal.App.2d 314 
[227 P.2d 281]; People v. Schunke, 102 Cal.App.2d 875 [228 
P.2d 620] ; People v. Ponce, 103 Cal.App.2d 271 [229 P.2d 
77].) The language of section 1265 is clear and defendant 
has presented no excuse for not applying to this court for 
coram nobis. 
With regard to the prior applications for habeas corpus 
both in this court and the federal courts mentioned by the 
attorney general, it appears that applications for habeas 
corpus were made to this court and denied on August 28, 
1951, and July 6, 1955. The United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in each case. The grounds advanced in those 
proceedings are the same, with one omission,2 as in the instant 
one. In the federal courts the district court held a hearing 
to determine the facts and then denied habeas corpus. That 
was affirmed by the court of appeals (Thomas v. Teets, supra, 
220 P.2d 232, 234) where the court stated the facts as follows: 
1
'' ••• if a judgment lms been affirmed on appeal no motion shall be 
made or proceeding in the nature of a petition for a writ of error 
coram nobis shall be brought to procure the vacation of said judgment, 
except m thE' court which affirmed the judgment on appeal." (Pen. 
Code, § 1265.) 
"Heretofore defendant had, in addition, claimed that the sheriff told 
him he had better plead guilty because if it got out that he was a 
Negro it would be had for him. The facts were determined adversely 
to him on that issue in the federal court proceedings, infra. 
Oct. 1955] PEOPLE V. THOMAS 
[45 C.2d 433; 290 P.2d 491] 
437 
" 'It is manifest that his attorney conveyed to petitioner the 
substance of the conversations had with the trial judge.' ... 
This of course is the testimony of the lawyer which it is 
apparent the trial court believed. This testimony disclosed 
that the lawyer fully advised Thomas of the seriousness of 
the situation; of the difficulty of decision as to whether to 
plead guilty or not guilty, and that Thomas himself made 
the decision, against the lawyer's advice, although the lawyer 
did not overrule it since Thomas appeared to be a very intel-
ligent person and he felt the decision should be made by 
Thomas." It was there concluded that defendant was not 
denied the effective assistance of counsel, or deceived by his 
counsel, or prevented from having a hearing on the degree 
of the crime and the punishment to be imposed. 
[2] The denial of habeas corpus by this court and by 
analogy the denial of a writ by the federal courts makes 
appropriate the application of the rule that: '' 'There is 
nothing ... to exclude this case from application of the 
established rule that a petition for habeas corpus based upon 
the same grounds set forth in a previous petition which was 
denied will be denied where there has been no change in the 
facts or law substantially affecting the legal rights of the 
petitioner.' (In re Miller (1941), 17 Cal.2d 734, 735 [112 
P.2d 10].)" (In re Chessman, 43 Cal.2d 391, 399 [274 P.2d 
645], quoting from In re De La Roi, 28 Cal.2d 264, 275 [169 
P.2d 363] .) In the automatic appeal this court said: "At 
that time, after a brief appearance in court, counsel for 
defendant and McCain's counsel, and the district attorney 
retired to the judge's chambers where the judge said that 
Mr. Brawman had spoken to him in regard to the possibility 
of defendant's avoiding the death penalty by making a 'cer-
tain' plea. The judge remarked that he had read the tran-
script of the preliminary hearing and that he was 'inclined' 
to give the 'extreme' penalty whether he pleaded guilty or 
not guilty. On returning to court, defendant pleaded guilty 
and December 11, 1950, was fixed as the time for 'pronouncing 
judgment,' later continued to December 14, 1950, when the 
court announced it would hear evidence on the degree of the 
offense. The district attorney called decedent's husband, 
Ainsworth, to the stand and he testified to the facts relating 
to the killing. Defendant's counsel was asked by the court 
if he wished to cross-examine and declined. The court then 
remarked: 'Step down (addressing the witness). I don't 
think we will need any further.' The district attorney then 
438 PEOPLE v. THOMAS [45 C.2d 
made the same remark, to which the court replied 'All right.' 
Defendant's counsel remained silent. The court then stated 
that it was murder of the first degree. Thereafter when asked 
by the court whether he had any legal cause to show why 
sentence should not be pronounced, defendant stood mute. 
'rhe death penalty was imposed. 
"There is no question that the evidence is ample to estab-
lish murder in the first degree, for it was committed while 
attempting to commit robbery. (Pen. Code, § 189.) Defend-
ant's excuse for not offering any evidence on the question 
of penalty is that the court's remark heretofore quoted fore-
closed such offer. 'l'hat remark may not necessarily be so 
construed, and the court, as seen, did not only take the 
evidence on the subject consisting of Ainsworth's testimony, 
but also the evidence given at the preliminary hearing which 
went into the details of the crime from the planning of it 
to the flight. Moreover, defendant stood mute when asked 
if he had any legal cause to show why sentence should not be 
pronounced and it was not until then that the death sentence 
was 'pronounced.' " (People v. Thomas, s11pra, 37 Cal.2d 74, 
75-76.) 
Insofar as the question of the alleged failure of the court 
to ask defendant if he had any reason why judgment should 
not be pronounced, we stated, as above set'n. on the auto-
matic appeal (People v. Thomas, s11pra. 37 Cal.2d 74, 76) 
that when def<"mlant was ashd th<" question he stood mute. 
Although it does not appear in the reporter's transcript 
whether the question was asked it was recited by the court 
in its judgment that it was. [3] In any event, while the re-
quirement (Pen. Code, § § 1200, 1201) that the question be 
asked is substantial and a failure to ask it is fatal to the 
judgment if defendant has been deprived of counsel (In re 
Levi, 39 Cal.2d 41 [244 P.2d 403]) it is not fatal where 
defendant is present and represented by counsel and no 
prejudice appears (People v. Henry, 86 Cal.App.2d 785 [195 
P.2d 478] ; People v. Hawthorne, 63 Cal.App.2d 262 [146 
P.2cl 517]; People v. Swift, 140 Cal.App. 7 [34 P.2d 1041]; 
People v. Wademan, 38 Cal.App. 116 [175 P. 791] ). [4] In 
the absence of any showing to the contrary we must assume 
that the r<"cital in the judgment is correct. (People v. W acle-
man, snpra, 38 Cal.App. 116, 137.) Defendant's counsel was 
fully advised of all circumstances bearing upon the d<"gree 
of the crinw am1 punishnwnt to be impos<"d and had an oppor-
tunity to present them at the hearing. Both defendant and 
PEOPLE v. THO:IfAS 
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his counsel were present when judgment was pronounced 
and no objection was made. 
[5] With respect to that part of defendant's motion which 
asked to withdraw his plea of guilty it has been said: ''The 
proper procedure for withdrawal of a plea after judgment 
is a motion to set aside the judgment and to permit a with-
drawal of the plea. Such a motion is in the nature of. and 
is subject to the rules governing, an application for a writ 
of coram nobis." (14 Cal.Jur.2d. Criminal Law. § 260.) 
[6] And ''An application for withdrawal of a guilty plea 
after judgment will be granted, however. only where there 
exists some fact that, had it been known to the court. would 
have prevented rendition of the judgment. which fact was 
not known to defendant at that time, and which. without 
fraud, mistake, or negligence of the defendant. was not pre-
sented to the court." (14 CaLJur.2d, Criminal I)aw, § 259.) 
No such after discovered facts appear here. 
In view of the repeated adjudications of the issues raised 
by defendant and the making of his application for the 
writ of coram nobis to the wrong court in the facE' of sec-
tion 1265 of the Penal Code, supra, defendant's appeal should 
be dismissed. (See People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320 [210 
P.2d 13]; People v. Shorts, 32 Cal.2d 502 [197 P.2d 3301; 
In re De La Roi, supra, 28 Cal.2d 264.) 
The appeal is dismissed, the stay of execution heretofore 
granted is terminated, and the trial court is directed to pro-
ceed with execution of its sentence in the manner provided 
by law. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
